Both the operational and the axiomatic method have had, and still have, great value for heuristic scientific research. Both methods have got such a refinement in the last decades that they could be practised successfully in several branches of science. Both methods are rooted in an age~old tradition. T h e Greek proved that it was possible to construct systems in which each proposition depends on propositions previously deduced and each term on terms previously defined. It is true that the foundations of such systems consist of unproved propositions and undefined terms, but it seems that the old Greek failed to realize the arbitrariness with which undefined terms and unproved propositions of a self-consistent system can be chosen. Certain propositions, which they could not prove, seemed to them 'self-evid, ent' and certain notions fundamental. In the history of axiomatics these 'self-evident truths' have played an important part. T h e brillant results obtained by the axiomatic method will have fed the contempt of the axiomaticists for experiment, an aversion which is quite comprehensible to any lover of categorial conclusions based on deduction. T h e discrepancies between reasoning and observation led to the postulation of the 'existence' of an ideal, perfect world, of which the observable realities were but imperfect reflections.
This conception has braved the ages, and it seems to us that mainly by the work of Mach, Poincard and Hilbert the situation has been clarified. For although, according to Mach, the general principles of science are abbrevi'ated economical descriptions and, according to Poincard, they are free creations of the human mind, for Hilbert, just as for Poincard, the axioms, as 'implicit definitions', are conventions about the use of the geometrical terms. T h e efforts made by some groups of scientists to integrate these views into one coherent system, Logical Empiricism (Significs with its analytical and its synthetical approach reveals an analogous tendency), and the strong impetus given to the operational approach by P. W. Bridgman have formed an integral part of the discussions of this sixth conference, where the subject was viewed from a psycho-linguistic, a psychological, a logical and an epistemological angle.
The Seventh International Significal Summer Conference may, in a certain sense, be regarded as the continuation of a course of lectures held by some professors of the University of Amsterdam during the academic year 1932/33. The papers read at these meetings were published in Dutch in 1933 under the title: De uitdrukkingswijze der wetenschap, science and its expression, under which title this conference has presented itself.
T h e main consideration underlying the conference programme may be reduced to the conception that it may be useful for certain purposes to distinguish forms of language and forms of thought and that the latter can be studied systematically in relation to the former.
During the last decades objections have been raised in signific circles to the traditional grammar, as it is taught in all kinds of teaching institutions. A similar tendency has revealed itself in some circles of logicians. Their common aim, resulting from an analysis of conversational language, seems to be the release of grammar from the bonds by which conventional grammar distorts the expression of thought.
Significists, linguists as well as logicians have sought new ways. Although analytic significs, as a systematic empirical study of the psychic associations underlying the acts of communication, does not aim at constructing a new grammar, in the strict sense of the word, it may give a contribution to certain parts of it. Its technique has been directed towards an analysis of what has been called in sig-nific circles the 'stratification' of the human forms of thought and language. Methods have been introduced and developed, especially by Mannoury, to expose the 'dispersion' of the signification of acts of communication (the method of transformation and that of exhaustion). And the idea of linguistic gradations based on the distinction of well-defined criteria, an idea originating from Jacob Israel de Haan about the twenties, has been more and more adopted in this field of investigation. Instead of formulating grammatical rules, some significists have developed a technique for the purpose of analysing the means of understanding in use and of constructing new terminologies. Other significists, however, like the linguist de Witte, have set themselves the task of building a new grammar by means of a comparative study of language.
The signific study of the language of groups, just as analytic signific studies in general, may be regarded as a region of the psychosociology of language. In the field of sociology this approach has been made in order to establish the 'group psychic correlate' of terms and expressions employed by groups in different circumstances. More and more the conception has gained ground, and not only in signific circles, that in sociological studies moral evaluations, philosophical theories and scientific facts shouldbe sharply distinguished. Sociological reports should mention what individuals do, not what they ought to do. Classifications of the material should not be made by the investigator before ample data are at his disposal; he should not anticipate the results of the enquiry. Content analysis, concept analysis, population analysis, etc. have proved to be valuable instruments for those scientists who follow this procedure. The study of the linguistic behavior of groups reveals many errors in this respect, and political science, as far a~s it deals with the registration of the linguistic phenomena of groups, when neglecting these factors, is not a science at all.
In discussions on the foundations of juridical science, the conference was faced with the following problem. According to Charles Morris, the language of law furnishes an example of designativeincitive discourse. It merely designates the steps the community says that it is prepared to take if certain actions are performed or not performed. Appraisals of the law or prescriptions with respect to law belong not, according to Morris, to legal discourse itself but to some other form of discourse (moral, critical, technological, etc.) . Some jurists, however, among them Henri L6vy-Bruhl and Roger Houin, stress, besides this aspect of juridical language, the sociological aspect of the science of law, the task of which is not only to for-mulate, to interpret and to apply the rules of law, but also to make empirical investigations into the linguistic behavior of individuals and groups, in order to gauge their attitude towards certain social institutions.
Psychological studies on the relation between mental activities and their symbolic expression in logic and mathematics occupy, as far as we know, a very small place in the literature on the foundations of these sciences. Writings on the foundations of intuitionistic mathematics and on the signific foundations of mathematics have dealt with some aspects of this item of the programme, the significance of which for didactic studies of these disciplines seems beyond any doubt. Piaget's original approach to the subject has highly stimulated our discussions during and after the conference.
T h e Eighth Significal Conference was devoted to the general theme: Non-Scien,tific Elements in the Development of Science. T h e aim of this conference was described in an explanatory note as follows:
"Science in the making shows certain non-scientific elements which may frustrate or stimulate fruitful progress. It is of importance to investigate whether such influences occur particularly in the earl,ier periods of development and tend to disappear when the field of investigation reaches more advanced stages. A signific analysis of the use of terms like 'scientific' and 'rational' in different circles of scientists should have preceded the discussions on the topic. Now, questions like the following were not out of place. Is the capacity to invent theories, to generalize without empirical observation, as equally deserving of the title 'rational' as the capacity to induce theories according to syntactical rules of reasoning from exact and 'true' premisses? Do we only ally the rational w i t h t h e scientific, with its empiricism and logical and mathematical lucidity? Some marking points were suggested for drawing a common line through the various round table discussions.
(1) A characterization of the special field of science under discussion by its field of investigations (observations) an~d its methods. The reader of this volume may judge on the basis of the papers presented at this conference (chapter III of this volume), how far these suggestions have been followed.
The publication of the Proceedings of the three conferences in one volume may be justified by the consideration.that all three have dealt with problems of methodology and sociology of science, and therefore with didactic and epistemological problems.
